Abstract: Baocang and Yupu proposed a relatively fast public key cryptosystem. The authors claim that the security of their system is based on two number-theoretic hard problems, namely the simultaneous Diophantine approximation problem and the integer factorisation problem. In this article we present a polynomial time heuristic attack that enables us to recover the private key from the public key. In particular, we show that breaking the system can be reduced to finding a short vector in a lattice which can be achieved using the L 3 -lattice reduction algorithm.
Introduction
Most public key schemes [1] are based on numbertheoretic cryptographic assumptions such as the integer factorisation problem or discrete logarithm problem. One common feature among the majority of these systems is that they are constructed based only on one cryptographic assumption. Although these assumptions seem hard to break today, once an efficient algorithm for solving the underlying hard number-theoretic problems is developed, these systems based on the intractability assumptions could be easily broken.
To overcome this problem, Baocang and Yupu [2] proposed a new, and relatively fast, public key system based on multiple cryptographic assumptions. Baocang and Yupu argue that their proposed system is expected to be more secure because it seems unlikely that the multiple hard problems could be simultaneously solved in an efficient way.
In this paper we present a polynomial time heuristic attack that enables us to recover the private key from the public key. In particular, we show that breaking the system can be reduced to finding a short vector in a lattice which can be achieved using the L 3 -lattice reduction algorithm [1, 3] .
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we give a brief description for the system proposed in [2] . In Section 3, we describe our attack. Finally we give a numerical example using the same encryption-decryption example in [2] .
2
Description of the Baocang-Yupu scheme
In this section we emphasise on the key generation step of the proposed public key scheme because of its relevance to our attack. Further details about the encryption and decryption operations and justification for the bounds on the parameters can be found in [2] .
Let k be the security parameter and n the dimension of the matrices used during encryption and decryption.
The key generation algorithm runs as follows:
1. Randomly generate two strong primes p and q with p k-bits long and q 3k-bits long. Set N ¼ pq. 
À1 is a diagonal matrix, then we have
5. Randomly choose an n-dimensional mod p invertible matrix T ¼ (t ij ). The matrix H ¼ (h ij ) is invertible mod N, where h ij is constructed via Chinese remainder theorem [4] , i.e.
The 4-tuple (H,N,m,e) forms the public key. The secret key consists of q and (a 1 , . . . ,a n ).
The encryption operation is performed by first randomly choosing an n-dimensional vector E ¼ (e 1 , . . . ,e n ), with e i < e, and splitting the plaintext
Attacking the scheme
In this section we present a polynomial time heuristic attack that enables us to recover the private key from the public key. In particular, this attack enables us to factor N and recover the matrix A using the matrix H only. As mentioned in [2] , once q and A are revealed, the system is totally broken. The Lenstra-Lenstra-Lova´sz (LLL, or L 3 ) lattice reduction algorithm [3] is an algorithm which, given a lattice basis as input, outputs a basis with relatively The author is with the Concordia Institute for Information Systems Engineering, Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, H3G 1M8 E-mail: youssef@ciise.concordia.ca short vectors. The L 3 algorithm has found numerous applications in cryptanalysis of several public-key encryption schemes such as knapsack cryptosystems, RSA with particular settings and many other systems [5, 6, 7] . For a description of the L 3 -lattice reduction algorithm and its applications in cryptanalysis, the reader is referred to [1, 8] .
The following lemma will be used in our attack:
Lemma 1: With the notation above we have
Proof: From Equations (1) and (2) we have
The rest of the proof follows by using the Chinese remainder theorem [4] and noting that we have (a i h ij p) mod p ¼ 0.
& As was noted by one of the anonymous reviewers, from the above formulation, recovering the secret key (a 1 , . . . ,a n ) is reduced to n hidden number problems [9] . The basic steps in the attack are as follows:
1. For each row (h i1 , h i2 , . . . ,h in ), 1 i n, in the matrix H, use the L 3 algorithm to find a reduced basis R for the (n þ 1)-dimensional lattice L which is generated by the rows of the matrix
2. For each row l ¼ (l 1 ,l 2 , . . . ,l n ,l n þ 1 ) in R (starting from the shortest one) such that l n þ 1 6 ¼ N do the following:
Return failure
The following lemma is used to justify the success of the attack.
Lemma 2:
The vector
is in L and has length less than
Using Lemma 1, the first part follows by noting that x is a linear combination of the rows of L. The second part follows by noting that |b i | < b % q 0.1 and a i % q 0. 5 . & Note that our lattice has dimension (n þ 1) and volume N n . From the lemma above, x is short compared with the (n þ 1) th root of the volume of the lattice. Hence, there is a good possibility that the L 3 algorithm will produce a reduced basis which includes the vector x [8] , which is verified by our experimental results.
Let {r 1 , r 2 , . . . ,r n þ 1 } denote the basis of the lattice L above. Let C 2 R be such that |r i | 2 C for i ¼ 1,2, . . . , n þ 1 and |r i | denote the Euclidean norm of the basis vector r i . From [1] , the number of arithmetic operations needed by the L 3 algorithm is O((n þ 1) 4 logC), on integers of size O ((n þ 1)logC) .
In order to reduce the attack complexity, once q is found, one can also apply the L 3 algorithm to the rows of the matrix G ¼ H mod q. In this case, for each row (g i1 , g i2 , . . . ,g in ),1 i n, in the matrix G, we use the L 3 algorithm to find a reduced basis R 0 for the (n þ 1)-dimensional lattice L 0 which is generated by the rows of the matrix
is in L 0 and has length less than
It is worth noting that the authors in [2] have discussed the lattice reduction attack and concluded that their proposed system is secure against this attack. This incorrect conclusion was drawn because they did not consider the right lattice to perform the attack.
It was also noted, by one of the anonymous reviewers, that our attack can be further optimised by multiplying all but the last column in the lattice bases (see equations 3, 4) by a factor of q 0. 4 . This balances the size of the entries in the target vector. Therefore, the norm of the target vector roughly stays the same while the determinant increases by a factor of q 0.4n .
Numerical example
In order to illustrate the steps in our cryptanalysis, we will use the same numerical example that was given in [2] . The L 3 -reduced basis (obtained using 
If G is to be used for the attack (after recovering q by any of the two attacks above), then the reduced bases obtained by considering the three rows in G are given by 
Conclusions
The system proposed by Baocang and Yupu is insecure. Using the L 3 lattice reduction algorithm, the system secret key can be derived from its known public key. We performed our attack on 10 random instances of the Baocang and Yupu system using the same security parameters suggested by Baocang and Yupu, i.e. n ¼ 16 and k ¼ 256. In all these 10 instances, we were able to fully recover the secret key in about 370 seconds (on average) using Maple 6.01, running on a DELL laptop with an Intel Ò Pentium Ò M processor, 1.6 GHz and 1.0 GB of RAM.
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